

# Ethnic Inclusion as a Campaign Strategy in Africa: A Survey Experiment in Kenya

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## Abstract

The study of ethnic mobilization helps explain why politicians mobilize support from the ethnic groups to which they belong. However, politicians in multiethnic democracies use ethnic appeals more broadly than simply mobilizing their own ethnic groups. In particular, an increasing number of African politicians make ethnically inclusive appeals to gain support from a broader range of ethnic groups. Using an original survey experiment carried out in Nairobi, Kenya, this study examines the effect of politicians' ethnic inclusiveness on voters' support, and shows that the respondents in Nairobi rewarded ethnically inclusive politicians. However, the effectiveness of ethnic inclusiveness was found only in ethnically diverse constituencies, and not in ethnically homogeneous constituencies. I argue that voters in diverse constituencies find broad and inclusive appeals to be more viable, compared to ethnic mobilization that targets a single ethnic group. This leads voters to reward inclusive candidates for having a more viable electoral strategy. The findings explain why ethnically inclusive appeals are used by politicians in Africa by demonstrating that ethnic diversity in constituencies strengthens the efficacy of ethnically inclusive appeals.

Keywords: Ethnicity; Voting; Africa; Ethnic Inclusiveness; Survey Experiment

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Ethnic mobilization is a commonly used electoral strategy in many African multi-ethnic democracies. For example, a long-lasting interethnic competition and antagonism between the Kikuyu and Kalenjin in Rift Valley, Kenya, was facilitated and sharpened by vote-seeking politicians who mobilized their support from their ethnic stronghold by appealing to the ethnic interests and interethnic antagonism between the two groups. This strategy was marked by repeated election-related violence (Lynch 2014). Whereas the scholarship established a good understanding of how politicians mobilize support from their own ethnic groups by appealing to their ethnic interests and interethnic antagonism (D. L. Horowitz 1985; Reilly 2001; Snyder 2000), these theories are not readily applicable to multiethnic constituencies in which appealing exclusively to one's own ethnic group does not attract enough votes and therefore is not an effective electoral strategy. Evidence suggests that an increasing number of African politicians use campaign messages to convey their ethnic inclusiveness instead of narrowly targeting voters of their own ethnic group (J. Horowitz 2012; J. Horowitz 2015). This study focuses on voters' responses to politicians' ethnic inclusiveness in multiethnic democracies in Africa. In particular, it examines whether the condition that makes ethnic mobilization ineffective in winning an election, namely the ethnic diversity of a constituency, influences voters to reward politicians' ethnic inclusiveness.

Voters take into account candidates' electoral viability when they make voting decisions (Abramowitz 1989; Conroy-Krutz 2013; Horowitz and Long 2016). Based on the assumption that voters would support a candidate with higher electoral viability, this study proposes that voters in diverse constituencies reward candidates who appeal to a broader range of ethnic groups, as the voters understand that broad and inclusive appeals are viable electoral strategies in winning majority support, whereas voters in ethnically homogeneous constituencies with a predominant ethnic group do not. As instrumentalist ethnic voting theories (Bates 1983; Posner 2004) suggest, if politicians and voters alike seek a minimum winning coalition to win an election, the parties would nominate a candidate from the dominant ethnic group for the constituencies with a predominant ethnic group and use ethnic mobilization to gain support from the dominant group; vot-

ers from the predominant ethnic group would support their co-ethnic candidate. In such constituencies, ethnic mobilization by the candidate from the predominant ethnic group is a viable strategy. In such conditions, ethnically inclusive candidates would not be rewarded, as ethnic inclusiveness is unlikely to be the most viable electoral strategy.

To test this proposition, I conducted an original survey experiment in Nairobi, Kenya, where ethnicity is politically salient and politicians have strong incentives to appeal to voters outside their own ethnic groups due to the ethnic diversity of most electoral constituencies. In the scenario read by the interviewers, respondents are given a description of two hypothetical candidates for an upcoming parliamentary election and are asked to choose between them. The candidates' description lists various attributes of each candidate, including whether a candidate is ethnically inclusive, all of which randomly vary.

The main attribute of the candidate, ethnic inclusiveness, randomly varies between the following: (1) no content about the candidate's ethnic inclusiveness, which is a control condition; (2) the candidate is described as ethnically inclusive, with an emphasis on ensuring benefits to "every" ethnic group, referred to as a "universal appeal;" and (3) the candidate is described as ethnically inclusive, with an emphasis on ensuring benefits to "under-privileged" groups, which is referred to as a "preferential appeal." The two types of ethnic appeals are inclusive in the sense that the message is crafted to appeal to those beyond the candidates' own ethnic groups. Each type differs by the degree of inclusiveness: universal appeals are inclusive of every ethnic group, whereas preferential appeals target underprivileged groups. Then, the overall effectiveness of ethnic inclusiveness on candidate support and its effectiveness by the type of appeal, either universal or preferential, is examined. Then, to test the proposition that ethnic diversity affects the efficacy of electoral strategies, I empirically examine how the effectiveness of ethnically inclusive appeals changes as the ethnic diversity of constituencies varies.

This study finds that the respondents in Nairobi reward ethnically inclusive politicians significantly for both universal and preferential appeal, although universal appeal showing a larger degree of inclusiveness has a significantly greater effect on candidate support.

The effects of ethnic inclusiveness on candidate support were substantively large. In particular, the magnitude of the universal appeal's marginal effect was larger than the effects of either party affiliation or co-ethnicity, in addition to other factors that have been known in the literature to be a critical determinant of voting decisions in Africa, such as clientelism. The magnitude of preferential appeal on candidate support, though smaller than the effect of universal appeal, was still substantively great, at least as great as the effect of party affiliation and larger than the effect of co-ethnicity. Hence, these results suggest that overall, ethnically inclusive messages are effective strategies in Nairobi.

The positive effects of ethnic inclusiveness of candidates on voters' support, however, were conditional on the ethnic diversity of the constituencies. When the analysis focuses only on constituencies with a predominant ethnic group in which making broader appeals is a less viable winning strategy, ethnically inclusive appeals were not found to be positive or statistically significant.

This paper contributes to the literature in several important ways. First, it contributes to the literature on campaign and electoral strategies in African democracies (Bleck and Van de Walle 2013; Conroy-Krutz 2013; Carlson 2015; Ferree 2010; Posner 2005; Scarritt 2006; Wantchekon 2003). While the majority of this literature does not consider "inclusive" ethnic appeals as an important electoral strategy, there is emerging literature that finds that ethnic inclusion and ethnically inclusive appeals are commonly used in African democracies (J. Horowitz 2012; J. Horowitz 2015). This study contributes to the emerging literature by suggesting a condition that makes ethnic mobilization an ineffective electoral strategy while increasing the effectiveness of ethnically inclusive messages: the ethnic diversity of constituencies.

Second, this paper contributes to the research on the ethnic voting literature in Africa, particularly the instrumentalist theories of ethnic voting (Carlson 2015; Conroy-Krutz 2013; Ichino and Nathan 2013; Posner 2005) in which candidates provide informational cues to the voters, who will benefit from the resource distribution. Voters support their co-ethnic candidate from the expectation that the access to resource distribution will come from an elected co-ethnic candidate. This study contributes to instrumentalist theories of

ethnic voting by suggesting conditions under which ethnic mobilization and ethnic voting are instrumental: ethnic diversity. This study shows that ethnic voting, which refers to voters' tendency to vote for a co-ethnic candidate is weakened in ethnically diverse constituencies. While the electability of a co-ethnic candidate through ethnic-voting is low in ethnically diverse constituencies, voting for co-ethnic candidates can be more instrumental for access to resource distribution and therefore strong in constituencies with a predominant ethnic group.

Third, it also contributes to the literature on the determinants of voting decisions in African democracies in which identifying the relative contribution of critical determinants of voting decisions on voters' preferences was challenging. In observational studies, the interconnectivity between competing theories made it difficult to identify their independent causal effects. In experimental studies in which identifying the causal effects of a limited number of determinants are possible, identifying the relative effects of multiple competing theories such as ethnic appeals, co-ethnicity, party affiliation, policy platforms and clientelism are constrained by reduced statistical power. This study uses an innovative experimental design, namely conjoint analysis (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014), which allows identification of the relative causal effects of making inclusive ethnic appeals in comparison to multiple determinants considered to be important in the literature by randomizing the values of multiple determinants in the study.

Fourth, this study also contributes to the emerging literature on the role of ethnic geography in voters' choice in Africa. Ichino and Nathan (2013) show that whether voters are ethnic minorities in their neighborhood affects the party they vote for. Whereas voters would vote for a candidate from their ethnic party if all other conditions were equal, they tend to support a candidate from the party of the ethnic majority in their neighborhood rather than a candidate of their own ethnic party if voters are ethnic minorities in the neighborhood. As the expected benefits from electing a co-ethnic candidate come in the form of local public goods which are non-excludable and non-rival, everyone in the neighborhood should benefit, including non-co-ethnic voters in the neighborhood. The findings from this study also provide evidence suggesting that voters should consider the

ethnic composition of their constituencies when making their voting decisions.

## **Ethnic Inclusion as Campaign Strategy in Multiethnic African Democracies**

D. L. Horowitz (1985) suggested that political elites in ethnically divided societies mobilize along ethnic lines to secure votes from their ethnic core. Ethnic mobilization through the targeting of an ethnic core (D. L. Horowitz 1985; Snyder 2000), however, is not a readily attractive electoral strategy in most multiethnic African democracies due to a high degree of ethnic diversity. While ethnic mobilization based on ethnic strongholds is applicable when the majority of voters can identify themselves with the ethnic party of a candidate, these conditions are often not met in multiethnic African democracies.

The majority of African democracies are highly ethnically diverse, and hence most ethnic groups are minorities and there is no dominant ethnic group (Fearon 2003; J. Horowitz 2015). For example, Kenya has more than 70 ethnic groups, among which the largest ethnic group, the Kikuyu, consists of less than 20% of the Kenyan population. Similarly, the Baganda, the largest ethnic group in Uganda, comprises less than 20% of the Ugandan population, which is constituted by more than 60 ethnic groups. In such ethnically diverse countries that lack a predominant ethnic group large enough to make it possible for a political candidate to win a nation-wide election simply based on mobilization of their co-ethnic voters, relying solely on a candidate's ethnic constituency is not a winning electoral strategy. At the same time, the majority of voters do not see a co-ethnic candidate on the ballot, especially in a national-level election, as the number of ethnic groups far outweighs the number of candidates on the ballot. Politicians in Africa frequently need to make broad appeals beyond their ethnic groups.

Recently, an increasing number of studies on electoral strategies in multiethnic African democracies find evidence that voters in such democracies are persuadable by electoral strategies (J. Horowitz 2012; J. Horowitz 2015; Weghorst and Lindberg 2013) and that political candidates in such democracies make significant efforts to appeal to the vot-

ers beyond their co-ethnic voters (J. Horowitz 2012; J. Horowitz 2015). The types of electoral strategies identified in the literature are roughly (a) clientelism (Wantchekon 2003) or vote buying (Vicente and Wantchekon 2009), (b) policy platforms (Weghorst and Lindberg 2013), and (c) promises or provision of small-scale “club goods” or local public goods (Ichino and Nathan 2013; Lindberg 2013). Electoral strategies such as clientelism and vote buying are viewed as competing explanations of ethnic mobilization and ethnic voting, as they are used as tools for “persuasion” rather than for “mobilization.” In multiethnic African democracies where ethnicity is politically salient, however, any electoral strategy is deeply interconnected with ethnicity, as the interests of voters, including policy preferences (Lieberman and McClendon 2013), vary across ethnic groups.

Therefore, an effective electoral strategy for political competitors in multiethnic democracies with politically salient ethnic divisions should address the interests of multiple ethnic groups in order to appeal to voters more broadly. This may have led politicians in Africa to urge for ethnic inclusion to address the political salience of ethnic divisions while appealing to broader voters, as political and economic inclusivity is equally desirable to voters regardless of ethnic group.

Based on the content analysis of actual campaign speeches during the 2007 Kenya’s election campaigns, J. Horowitz (2012) found evidence that the candidates not only made significant efforts to persuade voters outside their ethnic group, but that they also used ethnic content to indicate their universal inclusiveness. For example, the messages frequently included “promises to represent out-groups” and “promises to treat all groups equally” (J. Horowitz 2012, p. 115). It is somewhat surprising that candidates in Kenyan national elections frequently used ethnically inclusive campaign messages in the run up to the 2007 elections, particularly given the post-election violence, which was largely attributable to politicized ethnic mobilization. Negative ethnic content—often called hate speech—that political competitors frequently use is also known to have large influence on post-election violence (Lynch 2014). The combined evidence suggests that, although ethnic mobilization along ethnic lines clearly occurred in some electoral areas and influenced the post-election violence, in other electoral areas, and especially ones without a

co-ethnic candidate on the presidential ballot, ethnically inclusive messages were popular electoral strategies.

Despite the increasing use of inclusive ethnic messages as a campaign strategy in Africa, particularly to appeal to non-co-ethnic voters (J. Horowitz 2012), there has been little empirical examination of the effectiveness of such appeals on electoral gain and voters' preferences. To fill this gap, this paper examines the effect of politicians' ethnic inclusiveness on voters' support in a multiethnic African democracy. One possibility for explaining the large effect of ethnically inclusive messages on candidate support is the viability of the message - that is, whether voters believe the message promising that the candidate will represent the interests of multiple ethnic groups beyond their own will attract enough votes to win an election. Ethnically inclusive messages may be rewarded because they reinforce voters' beliefs about the viability of the message in ethnically diverse constituencies.

During the informal interviews and the focus group conducted prior to the survey, respondents in Nairobi expressed their doubts that any explicitly targeted ethnic appeal or ethnic favoritism would be successful in gaining votes in Nairobi due to the fact that the city is highly ethnically diverse. They did not think that "us vs. them" rhetoric, which divides ethnic groups, or exclusive targeting of co-ethnic voters were frequently used in Nairobi, and said such explicitly targeted ethnic appeals would be found more in rural settings, especially where clear ethnic divisions exist and use of the local language can provide cues that will only be understood by co-ethnics. Notice that the viability of ethnically inclusive messages depends largely on ethnic diversity in the electoral areas. If voters believe that targeting the candidate's ethnic group alone is not a winning strategy in ethnically diverse electoral areas, then a candidate's messages promising broad access to opportunities and resources beyond the candidate's ethnic group can reinforce their belief in that candidate's viability. On the other hand, ethnically inclusive messages are not likely to be consistent with voters' expectations in ethnically homogeneous constituencies, in which case ethnic mobilization would be a more viable strategy.

Given the assumption that voters would support a candidate with high electoral vi-

ability, the effectiveness of ethnic inclusivity on candidate support would depend on whether or not an inclusive appeal is a viable electoral strategy given the constituency. For example, appealing to one's co-ethnic voters is not a viable electoral strategy to obtain support in diverse constituencies. Voters in diverse constituencies understand that broad and inclusive appeals are more viable electoral strategies than exclusive and divisive messages, and hence a candidate who appeals broadly across ethnic groups may be rewarded. By contrast, in ethnically homogeneous constituencies or constituencies with a predominant ethnic group, ethnic mobilization by the candidate from the predominant ethnic group would be a viable electoral strategy. To obtain enough support, appealing to a dominant group's interest and focusing on mobilizing the dominant group's votes is a viable strategy. When a dominant group's co-ethnic candidate is on the ballot, ethnic mobilization to support that candidate is a viable strategy. There is not much incentive for broader appeals, especially if broader appeals risk losing the support of co-ethnic voters. I generate two testable hypotheses as follows:

**Hypothesis 1.** In an ethnically diverse constituency, voters will reward ethnically inclusive appeals.

**Hypothesis 2.** In a constituency with a predominant ethnic group, voters will reject an ethnically inclusive message.

## Research Design

To identify the causal effects of making ethnically inclusive appeals on candidate support, I conducted a survey experiment using informational vignettes. This survey experiment was conducted in Nairobi, Kenya, in July 2014, and it was embedded in a larger public opinion survey in the form of person-to-person interview. To produce a reasonably representative sample of the Nairobi population, I used a stratified, random sampling method where the all 17 constituencies in Nairobi were used as strata. The enumerators were instructed to follow a random walk pattern to randomly select households, and then use

a random procedure to select one respondent among all of the adult household members present at the time of the visit. Whereas the experimental design was to examine the effects of ethnically inclusive appeals on voters' preferences, further sub-group analyses were conducted to examine the conditions under which ethnically inclusive appeals are effective in influencing voters' preferences.

In the vignette, a respondent is presented with two hypothetical parliamentary candidates running for office in the next parliamentary election. The experiment used a full-profile randomized conjoint experiment where ten important attributes of the candidates are randomized. Among the ten attributes, the primary interest of this study - making ethnic appeals - randomly varies among three conditions: first, the control condition without any ethnic content in the candidate description; second, a treatment condition called "universal appeals" where a candidate makes an ethnically inclusive appeal that is framed to emphasize equal opportunity for "every" social and ethnic group; and third, another treatment condition called "preferential appeals" where a candidate makes an ethnically inclusive appeal, but the message is framed to stress the opportunity for "underprivileged" social and ethnic groups. The research design allows us to examine the overall effects of ethnically inclusive appeals as opposed to appeals without any ethnic content. It also allows us to examine how different degrees of inclusiveness can influence the effectiveness of using ethnically inclusive messages. Table 1 provides the wording used for the ethnically inclusive messages in the informational vignette.

While the focus of the study is on the effects of ethnically inclusive messages, it is important to compare the size of the effect of ethnically inclusive messages to the effects of important determinants of voting decisions as identified in the literature. For example, party affiliation and ethnicity are considered critical determinants of voting decisions made by African voters. Therefore, a list of key candidate attributes that are considered to be important determinants of voting decisions in Africa are also included and randomly assigned, as this study uses a full-profile randomized conjoint experimental design (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014). The randomly varied contents include a candidate's ethnicity, party membership, profession, education level, policy

Table 1: The treatment and control conditions for ethnically inclusive appeals

**Control:** No ethnic content

**Treatment 1: Ethnic Inclusion (Universal Appeal):** ... it is very important for all adolescents to have equal opportunities of having access to the universal secondary education, and said that he will make sure the adolescents from every social and ethnic group in the constituency will have an equal opportunity to secondary education.

**Treatment 2: Ethnic Inclusion (Preferential Appeal):** ... it is very important for all adolescents to have equal opportunities of having access to the secondary education, and said that he will make sure the adolescents from underprivileged social and ethnic groups in the constituency will have access to secondary education.

platform, and clientelistic messages.<sup>1</sup> Appendix A provides the lists of possible values each candidate attribute can have (i.e., levels).

Studies suggest that in multiethnic societies where information availability is limited, voters use candidates' ethnicities as an informational shortcut (Conroy-Krutz 2013; Ferree 2006; Posner 2005). That is, voters may infer from candidates' ethnicities information that is crucial to their voting decisions. In particular, instrumentalist theories of ethnic voting suggest that candidates' ethnicities provide voters with an informational shortcut regarding who will benefit from future goods distribution (i.e., the elected candidate's co-ethnic voters). To signal the candidate's ethnicity, I changed the last name of the

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<sup>1</sup>The vignette includes ten "attributes," which are the components to be varied, and each attribute has multiple conditions (i.e., "levels" from which the random assignment is drawn). The attributes include the candidate's ethnicity (5 levels), party (3 levels), types of ethnic appeal (3 levels), profession (3 levels), experience (3 levels), policy interests (2 levels), program vs. clientelism (2 levels), high school attended (6 levels), wealth (4 levels), religion (4 levels), and degree (3 levels). The high school attended attribute was included to test the possibility that the school attended can be a stronger signal than the candidate's ethnicity. This hypothesis was generated based on the focus group discussion.

candidate in the vignette, where the last name was randomly chosen from the list of commonly used last names from each of five ethnic groups: Kikuyu, Kalenjin, Kamba, Luhya, and Luo. Based on the candidate’s randomly assigned ethnicity, I created a variable called “ethnic match” to indicate whether the candidate’s ethnicity matches the respondent’s. If the randomly assigned candidate’s ethnicity is the same as the respondent’s ethnicity, the ethnic match takes the value of 1; otherwise, it takes the value of 0.

Similarly, considering the most realistic scenarios of parliamentary electoral competition in Nairobi, the party affiliation variable varied among three categories: a candidate from the National Alliance (TNA), a candidate from the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), and an independent candidate. Using this, the variable “party match” was created. If the candidate’s randomly assigned party is same as the party to which the respondent feels most closely affiliated, the party match variable takes the value of 1; otherwise, it takes the value of 0.

After presenting the description of the two candidates, the respondent was asked to choose which of the two candidates (s)he would like to vote for if the election were held tomorrow. I used the answer to this question as the primary outcome measure. Each respondent was presented with a candidate pair five times, presenting a total of ten candidates. Appendix A provides the lists of possible values each candidate attribute can take (i.e., levels), and Table 2 presents an example script from the vignette. The sample included 902 respondents drawn from all 17 parliamentary constituencies in Nairobi County. The completed dataset therefore had 4,510 ( $902 \times 5$ ) observations.

Table 2: Experimental Design: Vignette Example

### Introduction (Read by the enumerator)

Now I am going to describe some candidates who are considering running for parliament. I will describe two candidates and then ask you which one you would vote for if the election were held tomorrow.

### Vignette (Read by the enumerator)

John [Mwangi,] [a respected CEO in the Kenyan banking industry] [with fifteen years of experience], is considering running for the MP seat in [respondent's constituency] in the next election [on the TNA ticket]. In an interview with a newspaper last week, he emphasized the importance of [Education] in national development. He said he is promoting [free universal secondary education] [He added that, it is very important for all adolescents to have equal opportunities of having access to the universal secondary education, and said that he will make sure the children from every social, ethnic group in the constituency will have an equal opportunity to get secondary education]. He holds a [Master's degree] in Finance, owns [20,000 acres of lands] in his hometown, and [a devoted member of a Catholic church]. He went to [Alliance Boys] secondary school.

Joseph [Onyango,] [a respected government official in the county government] [with twenty years of experience], is considering running for the MP seat in [respondent's constituency] in the next election [on the ODM ticket]. In an interview with a newspaper last week, he emphasized the importance of [Education] in national development. He said he is promoting [free universal secondary education]. He holds a [Master's degree] in Political Science, owns [10,000 acres of lands] in his hometown, and [a devoted member of a Protestant church]. He went to [Strathmore] secondary school.

Which candidate would you choose if the election were held tomorrow?

Note. Any level appearing in [ ] indicates a randomly chosen value among all possible levels of each attribute.

## Results

Figure 1 shows the marginal effects (i.e., average marginal component effects [AMCEs])<sup>2</sup> of ethnically inclusive messages on candidate support. The marginal effect of both types of appeals combined, as well as each appeal’s separate marginal effects, are shown. The AMCE of each ethnically inclusive message represents the expected change in the probability that a respondent would support the candidate when a given ethnic appeal is made in comparison to when no ethnic content is presented (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014).


The results suggest that respondents significantly reward the candidates for making inclusive ethnic appeals regardless of the type of appeal, whether universal or preferential; however, the reward is significantly higher for universal than for preferential appeals. The combined results suggest that when a candidate makes an ethnically inclusive appeal, the probability that a respondent would choose that candidate increases by 9.8% (SE = 0.011) on average compared to when no ethnically inclusive appeal was made. The results based on each type of appeal suggest that, when a universal appeal is made, the probability that a respondent will support that candidate increased 12.1% compared to a candidate whose message has no ethnic content. When a preferential appeal is made, the likelihood of supporting the candidate is still significantly greater (7.8%) than when no ethnically inclusive appeal is made. The 4.3% difference (12.1 – 7.8) in the marginal effects was statistically significant at  $p < .001$  in a two-sided t-test. This difference suggests that universal appeals can be more effective in increasing voter support than preferential appeals.

Despite the significant difference between the two types of ethnic appeals, either

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<sup>2</sup>Following Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014, I estimate the following regression model to obtain the AMCEs for each type of ethnically inclusive message:  $Y_{ijk} = \alpha + \beta_1[T_{ijk} = 1] + \beta_2[T = 2] + \epsilon_{ijk}$ , where  $Y$  indicates a respondent choice (1 if the respondent supports the candidate and 0 otherwise),  $T = 1$  indicates the first treatment condition where the universal appeal is used, and  $T = 2$  indicates the second treatment condition where the preferential appeal is used.

Figure 1: Main Results: AMCEs of Ethnically Inclusive Messages




Notes. Point estimates and their 95% confidence intervals are presented. The baseline estimate of the probability for a candidate under the control condition (no ethnic content) is 0.44 (0.01). The figures in parenthesis are clustered standard errors.

type of ethnically inclusive appeal can be highly influential in determining the electoral outcome. That is, while we would expect that a candidate who makes no ethnic appeal would receive 44% of the votes on average, when ethnically inclusive appeals are made, the support would increase to 56% of the votes (in the case of universal appeals) or to 52% of the votes (in the case of preferential appeals).

The claim that ethnically inclusive appeals are highly influential can be further examined by comparing their marginal effects to those of other candidate attributes. In particular, how do the average increases in candidate support brought about by ethnically inclusive appeals (9.8%) or universal (12.1%) or preferential (7.8%) appeals compare substantively to the effects of other attributes? To answer this question, Figure 2 shows the AMCEs of all components in the vignette, which allows for the direct comparison of the average contribution of each component to candidate support. First, the AMCE of ethnically inclusive messaging (9.8%) was larger than any other contribution by a candidate attribute, including party affiliation and co-ethnicity, which have been known in the literature to be critical determinants of voting decisions in Africa.

Notice that the contribution to candidate support was especially large for the universal appeal (12.1%), while the average increases in candidate support from having the same party (7.7%) or ethnicity (6.3%) were significantly smaller. The differences in the AMCEs of ethnically inclusive messages with universal appeals (12.1%) and party affiliation (7.7%) or co-ethnicity (6.3%) were statistically significant at  $p < .01$  and  $p < 0.05$ , respectively, in the two-sided t-tests. The differences in the AMCEs of preferential appeals (7.8%) and party-match (7.7%) and ethnic-match (6.3%) were smaller and not statistically significant at  $p = 0.82$  and  $p = 0.62$ , respectively, in the two-sided t-tests. Regardless of the type of inclusive messages, the effects of inclusive appeals on candidate support were no less than the effect of party affiliation and co-ethnicity, which are known to have large effects on voters' preferences. The results suggest the effect of making ethnically inclusive appeals is not only statistically significant, but also large.

Figure 2: AMCEs of All Attributes



Notes.  $N = 9,020$ . Point estimates and their 95% confidence intervals are presented. Cluster standard errors are used at the respondent level. The baseline category for Ethnic Appeal is no ethnic appeal; the baseline category for Education Level is a BA degree. The baseline category for Religion is no information on the competitor's religion; the baseline category for Wealth is no information on the competitor's wealth; the baseline category for Clientelist is the programmatic appeal; the baseline category for Policy Platform is education policy; the baseline category for Experience is the lowest level, 15 years; the baseline category for Profession is a specialist in community development.

# Ethnic Diversity and Effectiveness of Ethnically Inclusive Messages

Why do respondents reward candidates who make ethnically inclusive appeals? I argue that ethnic diversity makes an ethnically inclusive appeal a viable electoral strategy. That is, the overall effectiveness of ethnically inclusive messaging in Nairobi can be attributed to the ethnic diversity of most constituencies in Nairobi, where ethnically inclusive appeals are viable. Although Nairobi is a highly ethnically diverse capital city, there is variation in terms of ethnic diversity across constituencies. For example, two out of the 17 constituencies included in this study had a predominant ethnic group, which is defined as more than 50% of the constituency's population. The rest of the constituencies in Nairobi do not have a single predominant ethnic group, although the Kikuyu had greater average representation than other ethnic groups. The variation in ethnic diversity by constituency allowed me to test the hypotheses presented earlier: voters in ethnically diverse constituencies will reward ethnically inclusive appeals, whereas those in homogeneous constituencies or constituencies with a predominant ethnic group will not.

To test the hypothesis, I empirically examine whether ethnic diversity influences the effect of ethnically inclusive messaging on candidate support. Unfortunately, due to the Bureau of Statistics' policy not to make the ethnic composition data of smaller administrative units publicly available, I relied on an estimate of the ethnic fractionalization index, which I calculated using the survey data. The standard Ethnic Fractionalization Index (EFI<sup>3</sup>) and the estimated population of each ethnic group were used. The EFI measures the probability that two randomly selected individuals belong to different ethnic groups. Only one out of the 17 constituencies included in the survey had a low EFI (0.2), and in this constituency, almost 90% of the sample was from one ethnic group, the

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
<sup>3</sup>The Ethnic Fractionalization Index in Constituency  $j = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^n p_{ij}^2$ , where  $i$  indicates an ethnic group,  $j$  indicates a constituency, and  $p_{ij}$  indicates the proportion of ethnic group  $i$  in the constituency  $j$ .

Kikuyu. All other constituencies were ethnically diverse ( $EFI = 0.65$  or higher), and of these only one had an ethnic group that exceeded 50% of the population in that constituency. I divided the sample into the constituencies that had a predominant ethnic group (50% or higher) and those that did not (less than 50%).

Figure 3 presents the AMCEs of ethnically inclusive messaging on candidate support conditional on the ethnic diversity of constituencies. The overall effect (left panel) and the separate effects by degree of inclusiveness (the right panel) were estimated according to the type of message, either universal or preferential. The effects of the interaction terms between each ethnic appeal and a dummy variable indicating whether the constituency had a predominant ethnic group were also estimated. If voters would reward the ethnically inclusive message only when the constituency is ethnically diverse, then we would expect that (a) the marginal effects of the ethnically inclusive messages should be positive and statistically significant, (b) the marginal effects of the interaction terms should be negative and statistically significant, and (c) the negative effects of the interaction terms would outweigh the positive effects of independent terms of ethnically inclusive messages. This would ensure that the marginal effects of ethnically inclusive messages are positive and significant in ethnically diverse constituencies, while they are negative and significant in constituencies with a predominant ethnic group. The results shown in Figure 3 were consistent with the hypothesis: ethnically inclusive messages were rewarded only in ethnically diverse constituencies, and rejected in constituencies with a predominant ethnic group.

There are caveats in interpreting these results. The cut-off of 50% that I used to define a whether or not an ethnic group is predominant is an estimate based on sample averages, which may differ somewhat from the percentage breakdown of an actual constituency's population. In case the Kikuyu population in the sample was overestimated, I recategorized a dummy variable that indicates the constituencies with a predominant ethnic group so that it now indicates a high level of ethnic homogeneity (i.e. a 90% Kikuyu population or higher and  $EFI = 0.2$ ). I then re-estimated the marginal effects of ethnically inclusive messages by ethnic diversity. The results are very similar to the ones

Figure 3: AMCEs of Ethnically Inclusive Appeals Conditional on Ethnic Diversity



Notes.  $N = 9,020$ . There are 640 observations for constituencies with a predominant ethnic group, and 8,410 observations for ethnically heterogeneous constituencies. Point estimates and their 95% confidence intervals are presented. Cluster standard errors are used at the respondent level.

before recategorization. (See Appendix B.)

In case the Kikuyu proportion based on the sample averages was underestimated, I re-categorized constituencies where the sample percentage of the largest ethnic group, Kikuyu, were slightly under 50% as constituencies with a predominant ethnic group. (See Appendix C.) With this alternative categorization, the results were somewhat weaker. That is, while the marginal effects of the ethnically inclusive messages were positive and statistically significant and the marginal effects of the interaction terms were negative and statistically significant, the negative effects did not outweigh the positive effects of the independent terms of ethnically inclusive messages. With the alternative categorization of constituencies with a predominant ethnic group, however, it is still observed that the constituencies without predominant ethnic groups show significantly larger marginal effects of ethnically inclusive appeals. Overall, all these findings consistently show that ethnically inclusive messages are rewarded more positively in ethnically diverse constituencies than constituencies with a predominant ethnic group.

# Alternative Explanations for the Effectiveness of Ethnically Inclusive Appeals

Although the empirical findings are consistent with the argument presented above, alternative explanations may also explain the effectiveness of ethnically inclusive messages on candidate support in Nairobi, where most constituencies are ethnically diverse.

## Small Share of Ethnic Voting

One plausible alternative is that voters in Nairobi may have few opportunities for instrumentalist ethnic voting, as a large proportion of respondents may not have co-ethnic candidates on the ballot.


Instrumentalist ethnic voting theory (Bates 1983; Chandra 2007; Conroy-Krutz 2013; Ichino and Nathan 2013; Posner 2004; Posner 2005) suggests that voters expect the election of a co-ethnic candidate to benefit their ethnic groups once elected. Under these assumptions, ethnically inclusive appeals made by a co-ethnic candidate are not consistent with voters' expectations. That is, co-ethnic voters may consider the candidate's ethnically inclusive appeals to be sub-optimal if that means benefits would be shared across different ethnic groups. In such a case, ethnically inclusive messages are likely to be rejected by co-ethnic voters. It may be the case that voters would punish ethnically inclusive appeals made by a co-ethnic candidate, but the negative effect of ethnically inclusive messages on the small proportion of co-ethnic voters may be outweighed by the positive effects of inclusive messaging on non-co-ethnic voters.

If this alternative hypothesis explains the effectiveness of ethnically inclusive appeals in Nairobi, a candidate's ethnicity would moderate the effects of ethnically inclusive messages on the support level given to the candidate. Therefore, I examined whether candidates' ethnically inclusive appeals were rewarded exclusively by non-co-ethnic respondents, and rejected by co-ethnic respondents. I included in the regression the interaction terms between the ethnically inclusive appeals and ethnic-match, the coefficients of which would be negative and significant if this alternative hypothesis was at work. In

particular, we would observe the following: (a) the marginal effects of ethnically inclusive appeals are positive and statistically significant without the interaction terms; and (b) the marginal effects of the interaction terms between the ethnic-match and ethnically inclusive appeals are negative and statistically significant.

The empirical results are shown in Figure 4. The coefficients for the interaction terms between ethnic-match and ethnically inclusive messages were not statistically different from 0, regardless whether combined, universal or preferential appeals were considered. Hence, no statistically significant difference was found in the effect of ethnic inclusiveness on candidate support between a candidate's co-ethnic and non-co-ethnic respondents. The results suggest that voters reward the candidate who shows ethnic inclusiveness, whether or not the candidate is of the same ethnicity. The results imply that the effectiveness of ethnically inclusive messages in Nairobi is not simply the result of a small share of instrumental ethnic voters who are motivated by having more access to resources.

Figure 4: AMCEs of Ethnically Inclusive Appeals Conditional on Ethnic Match



Notes. N = 9,020. Point estimates and their 95% confidence intervals are presented. Cluster standard errors are used at the respondent level.


## Kikuyu Effects

In all 17 constituencies, the Kikuyu are estimated to be the largest group. That is, in the constituencies with a predominant ethnic group, the Kikuyu were always the predominant ethnic group. Hence, the previous results on the effectiveness of ethnic appeals that were conditional on ethnic diversity could be attributed to the predominance of the Kikuyu population rather than to ethnic diversity. In particular, the difference in the effectiveness of ethnically inclusive appeals between the ethnically diverse constituencies and the constituencies where the largest ethnic group (the Kikuyu) exceeded 50%, could possibly be attributed to the different policy preferences of the Kikuyu population. Lieberman and McClendon (2013) showed that policy interests vary across different ethnic groups. If Kikuyu voters have different interests – for example, if they do not like ethnically inclusive messages while other groups do – then the effectiveness of ethnically inclusive appeals may be driven largely by voters from the Kikuyu ethnic group rather than by ethnic diversity.

The results suggest that neither the overall effectiveness of ethnically inclusive messages nor the difference in the effectiveness of ethnic inclusiveness on voters' support by ethnic diversity across constituencies can be explained by the preferences of Kikuyu voters. Figure 5 shows the results from the regression including ethnically inclusive appeals, with the dummy variable indicating constituencies with a predominant ethnic group, and their interaction terms focusing on the sample that included Kikuyu respondents only. The Kikuyu voters' preference for ethnically inclusive messages were not consistent throughout constituencies, but it varied depending on the ethnic diversity of the constituencies. That is, although the Kikuyu respondents in the constituencies where they were the predominant ethnic group punished the ethnic inclusiveness of candidates (especially for universal appeals), the Kikuyu respondents in more ethnically diverse constituencies did not. Instead, the Kikuyu respondents in diverse constituencies rewarded ethnically inclusive candidates no less than respondents from other ethnic groups.

In addition, Table 3 shows the marginal effects of ethnically inclusive appeals (both for universal and preferential appeals) by ethnic group. Although there is some varia-

Figure 5: AMCEs Conditional on Ethnic Diversity for Kikuyu Respondents Only



Notes.  $N = 3,780$ . All respondents are from the Kikuyu ethnic group. There are 390 observations for predominantly Kikuyu constituencies, and 3,390 observations for ethnically diverse constituencies. Point estimates and their 95% confidence intervals are presented. Cluster standard errors are used at the respondent level.

tion across ethnic groups in terms of the effect size, Kikuyu voters’ preference for ethnic inclusiveness was not substantively different from other ethnic groups in that the respondents rewarded candidates who made ethnically inclusive appeals, and those who made universal appeals were rewarded more than those who made preferential appeals.<sup>4</sup> These results suggest that it is not the specific ethnic group’s interests or characteristics but rather ethnic diversity that influence how voters reward or reject the candidates’ ethnic inclusiveness.

Table 3: Effectiveness of Ethnically Inclusive Messages by Respondents’ Ethnicity

Appeal	Kikuyu	Luo	Kalenjin	Luhya	Kamba	Kisii
Universal	0.104*** (0.020)	0.091** (0.038)	0.105 (0.080)	0.167*** (0.033)	0.105** (0.045)	0.176*** (0.047)
Preferential	0.055*** (0.020)	0.047 (0.038)	0.138** (0.061)	0.082*** (0.030)	0.115*** (0.040)	0.118* (0.059)
Constant	0.454*** (0.009)	0.462*** (0.016)	0.429*** (0.033)	0.431*** (0.0140)	0.440*** (0.018)	0.413*** (0.025)
N	3800	1120	360	1450	930	550

Note. \*p < 0.05; \*\*p < 0.01; \*\*\*p < 0.001; clustered standard errors are used.

## Predominance of Party Politics

Another potential explanation for the overall effectiveness of ethnically inclusive messages in Nairobi is the strength of the National Alliance (TNA) in the parliamentary elections in Nairobi. The campaign slogan of the Jubilee Alliance<sup>5</sup> for ethnic unity (and TNA, which is a part of the Jubilee coalition) might have made Jubilee and TNA supporters more accustomed to ethnically inclusive messages. This may have driven the TNA support-

<sup>4</sup>Among the six largest ethnic groups considered, voters from the Kamba and Kalenjin either preferred the preferential appeal more or were indifferent regarding the two appeals.

<sup>5</sup>The Jubilee Alliance is a multi-party coalition consisting of the National Alliance, the National Rainbow Coalition, the United Republican Party, and the Republican Congress.

ers to reward the candidates with ethnically inclusive messages more so than non-TNA supporters. However, in Nairobi, it is not clear that TNA is a dominant party: in the 2013 parliamentary election, TNA won 9 seats, which slightly outnumbered the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), which won 8 seats. Also, among the respondents of the survey, only 25.08% identified with TNA,<sup>6</sup> whereas 23.29% identified with the ODM. It is not clear whether Nairobi is a stronghold of any party, including the two major ones (TNA and the ODM).


Even so, I conducted an additional analysis to see whether the supporters of the Jubilee Alliance, including TNA supporters, would reward ethnically inclusive messages while supporters of other parties would not. I did this by including the ethnically inclusive messages, affiliation with the Jubilee Alliance, and the interaction terms between the inclusive messages and the affiliation with the Jubilee Alliance. The results are shown in Figure 6. Jubilee supporters did not reward the candidates who made appeals for ethnic inclusiveness (universal or preferential) any more than those who were not Jubilee supporters. If anything, Jubilee supporters seemed to reward ethnically inclusive messages less than non-Jubilee supporters do, though the negative coefficients for the interaction terms were not statistically different from 0 at the 95% confidence level.

Another possibility is that the respondents may reward candidates who already have a reputation for making ethnically inclusive appeals. As the Jubilee Alliance/TNA party used inclusion in their slogan, ethnically inclusive messages coming from a TNA candidate may have reinforced voters' expectations about that candidate being ethnically inclusive. If this is the case, making an ethnically inclusive appeal will have a positive and significant effect on voter preference if the promise is made by a TNA candidate, while an ethnically inclusive appeal by a candidate from another party will not positively influence voter preference. If the positive effects of inclusive messages made by a TNA candidate outweigh the non-positive effects of inclusive messages made by other candidates, this

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<sup>6</sup>A total of 31.26% of respondents identified with one of the parties in the Jubilee Alliance, including TNA, the United Republican Party (URP), and the Party of National Unity (PNU).

Figure 6: AMCEs of Ethnically Inclusive Messages Conditional on Party Affiliation




Notes.  $N = 9,020$ . Point estimates and their 95% confidence intervals are presented. Cluster standard errors are used at the respondent level.

may explain the overall effectiveness of ethnically inclusive messages in Nairobi. The results presented in Figure 7 indicate that the candidate's party, whether TNA or not, was not found to mediate the effect of ethnically inclusive appeals, regardless of whether the appeal is combined, universal, or preferential. These results suggest that neither being a Jubilee/TNA supporter nor the TNA's campaign slogan emphasizing unity can explain the overall effectiveness of ethnically inclusive messages in Nairobi.

## Discussion

The empirical results indicate that voters reward candidates who make ethnically inclusive appeals in ethnically diverse constituencies, because the ethnic diversity of constituencies make ethnically inclusive appeals more effective at winning an election. However, as the ethnic diversity across constituencies is not randomly assigned, the results can-

Figure 7: AMCEs of Ethnically Inclusive Messages Conditional on Candidate's Party



Notes.  $N = 9,020$ . Point estimates and their 95% confidence intervals are presented. Cluster standard errors are used at the respondent level.

not be viewed as a definitive causal interpretation in which ethnic diversity causes the effectiveness of ethnically inclusive appeals.

There are other plausible possibilities that can explain why ethnically inclusive appeals are effective in diverse constituencies but not in constituencies with a predominant ethnic group. The first possibility is a selection effect that is associated with migration patterns to Nairobi. That is, when people from outside of Nairobi to migrate to Nairobi, their decision about where in Nairobi to reside may be influenced by the ethnic makeup of a given constituency. For example, Kikuyu voters outside Nairobi may want to move to constituencies where they have relatives, who are likely to be from the same ethnic group. This may have influenced the Kikuyu migrants to settle in the Kikuyu-dominant constituencies instead of other constituencies.

If new migrants were from constituencies with competing ethnic groups, they may respond to ethnically inclusive messages negatively because they are likely to have developed antagonistic views toward other ethnic groups. In particular, if their reasons for moving to Nairobi were electoral violence that resulted from ethnic competition between

the Kikuyu and other groups, these voters would not reward candidates making ethnically inclusive appeals, which provides a possible explanation for why the effectiveness of ethnically inclusive appeals were positive only in ethnically diverse constituencies. In this scenario, ethnic voting by Kikuyu voters would be stronger in Kikuyu-dominant constituencies.

To test this, I ran a regression on a interaction term between ethnic-match and the dummy variable indicating the Kikuyu-dominant constituencies for Kikuyu respondents only, and the results are shown in Appendix D. The results show that the interaction term had a large, positive effect but was not statistically different from 0 at the 95% confidence level ( $p = 0.065$ ). While the results were only weakly significant, they suggest a greater amount of ethnic voting among Kikuyu in Kikuyu-dominant constituencies than those in more diverse constituencies.

To distinguish this alternative hypothesis of selection effect, further examination is required. In particular, I would like to examine whether new Kikuyu immigrants tend to move to Kikuyu-dominant constituencies rather than diverse constituencies, and also whether new immigrants have been exposed to ethnic mobilization and ethnic antagonism prior to moving to Nairobi. The current survey does not include a set of questions to address this possibility.

There are other reasons that can potentially explain why ethnically inclusive messages were effective in diverse constituencies of Nairobi but not in constituencies with a predominant ethnic group. For example, the contact hypothesis in social psychology (Allport 1979) suggests that voters in ethnically diverse constituencies may develop more inclusive attitudes or affinities toward other ethnic groups than if they were living in ethnically homogeneous constituencies, due to more frequent interactions with other ethnic groups. Although this is a plausible hypothesis, the current research design does not allow for it to be tested rigorously. Future studies need to examine (a) whether Kikuyu residents in ethnically diverse constituencies interact more frequently with members of other ethnic groups than those in constituencies where Kikuyu is a predominant ethnic group and (b) whether Kikuyu residents in diverse constituencies have more positive attitudes

toward other ethnic-groups than those in constituencies where Kikuyu is a predominant group do.

## Conclusions

Though politicians in multiethnic democracies in Africa often use ethnically inclusive appeals, the literature has focused mostly on the use of ethnic mobilization to attract support from candidates' ethnic groups . This study has used the results from an original survey experiment conducted in Nairobi, Kenya, a multiethnic democracy in Africa, to examine the effectiveness of politicians' use of broad ethnic appeals, and the results indicate that the respondents in Nairobi reward politicians who are ethnically inclusive. The results also indicate that ethnically inclusive messages were effective in ethnically diverse constituencies, but not in constituencies with a predominant ethnic group. This potentially explains the overall effectiveness of ethnically inclusive appeals in Nairobi, which is a highly ethnically diverse city.

I have argued that ethnic diversity moderates the effectiveness of ethnically inclusive appeals, as it influences how voters perceive the viability of an electoral strategy. In particular, making broad, ethnically inclusive appeals can be considered to be a viable electoral strategy in diverse constituencies, while ethnic mobilization and appealing to a single ethnic group becomes a less viable electoral strategy. On the other hand, ethnic mobilization to attract votes from a candidate's own ethnic group can be a more viable strategy in ethnically homogeneous constituencies. Voters reward candidates who make ethnically inclusive appeals if this appears to be a viable strategy for winning an election, but not if the message is perceived to be not viable. The effect of ethnically inclusive, universal appeal was especially large, and it was larger than the effect of most other attributes of political competitors that are considered to be critical determinants of voting decisions in the literature, including party affiliation and ethnicity of candidates.

I have conducted further analyses to see whether the overall effectiveness of ethnically inclusive messages on candidate support in Nairobi can be explained by alternative

hypotheses, such as the influence of ethnic voting or party competition. First, the instrumentalist ethnic voting theory would suggest that ethnically inclusive messages are inconsistent with voters' expectations about what a co-ethnic candidate should do, and as a result voters may punish a co-ethnic candidate who appears to be ethnically inclusive. Due to the small percentage of voters in the study who had a co-ethnic candidate, it is possible that the punishment of co-ethnic candidates making ethnically inclusive appeals was outweighed by the rewards given to non-co-ethnic candidates making ethnically inclusive appeals. However, respondents rewarded co-ethnic and non-co-ethnic candidates almost equally.

Second, as the Jubilee Alliance had a campaign slogan expressing unity in the run up to the 2013 election, Jubilee supporters might have developed a preference for ethnic inclusion more than non-Jubilee supporters, and the Jubilee supporters' preference for ethnic inclusiveness may have driven the overall effectiveness of ethnically inclusive messages. However, respondents' party affiliation did not affect their preference for ethnically inclusive messages. In addition, the TNA/Jubilee candidate did not seem to receive any more support than non-TNA/Jubilee candidates when they made ethnically inclusive appeals. This suggests that ethnic inclusion would be an effective strategy not just for a particular party, but more universally.

I have also pointed out that, although the empirical findings clearly indicated that ethnic diversity moderates the effectiveness of ethnically inclusive messages, the causal explanations need further examination. In addition to the explanation suggested in this study, in which ethnic diversity makes inclusive messages more viable as a winning strategy and ethnic mobilization based on a candidate's co-ethnic voters less viable, other explanations may also be able to explain this empirical observation. In particular, a selection effect may exist if voters who were previously exposed to ethnic mobilization and ethnic antagonism migrate to constituencies in Nairobi where their ethnicity is predominant. This may also explain why ethnically inclusive messages are effective in diverse constituencies but not in constituencies with a predominant ethnic group. Although there was a lack of strong evidence supporting this possibility, further research will be

important to identify the causal mechanism behind the influence of ethnic diversity on the effectiveness of ethnically inclusive messages.

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
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## Appendix A: Conjoint Analysis Design

Attributes (Number of levels)	Level
Ethnicity (5)	Kikuyu ; Luo ; Luhya ; Kalenjin; Kamba
Profession (3)	A respected CEO in the Kenyan banking industry A respected government official in county government in Kenya A respected specialist in community development in Kenya
Years of Experience (3)	15 years; 20 years; 25 years
Party (3)	TNA; ODM; Independent
Platform (2)	Health; Education
Programmatic vs. Clientelistic (2)	<i>If Health is selected in the policy platform:</i> Universal health care; Building health clinics <i>If Education is selected in the policy platform:</i> Universal secondary education; Building secondary schools
Type of ethnic appeals (3)	No message Equal representation of all ethnic groups Improved representation of the marginalized ethnic group
Degree (3)	Holds a PhD degree in [Field of Study] Holds a Master's degree [Field of Study] Holds a Bachelor's degree [Field of Study]
Wealth (4)	No message 20,000 Acres of lands in his hometown 10 Acres of lands in his hometown 1 Acer of land in his hometown
Religion (4)	No Message; Catholic; Protestant; Pentecostal
High School Attended (6)	Alliance Boys secondary school Strathmore secondary school Mangu Boys secondary school Starehe Boys secondary school Nairobi secondary school Lenana secondary school


Notes. A candidate's field of study and where (s)he received a degree depends on the candidate's profession. If the stated profession is in the banking industry (local government/community development), the respondent's field of study is Finance (Political Science/Social Work).

## Appendix B: Alternative Categorization of Predominant Ethnic Group Population - Case for Overestimation




Notes.  $N = 9,020$ . There are 180 observations for ethnically homogeneous constituencies and 8,840 observations for ethnically heterogeneous constituencies. Point estimates and their 95% confidence intervals are presented. Cluster standard errors are used at the respondent level.

## Appendix C: Alternative Categorization of Predominant Ethnic Group Population - Case for Underestimation



Notes.  $N = 9,020$ . There are 2,060 observations for constituencies with a predominant ethnic group and 6,960 observations for ethnically diverse constituencies. Point estimates and their 95% confidence intervals are presented. Cluster standard errors are used at the respondent level.

## Appendix D: Ethnic Voting of Kikuyu Respondents by Ethnic Diversity of Constituencies



N = 3,780. All respondents are from the Kikuyu ethnic group. There are 390 observations for predominantly Kikuyu constituencies and 3,390 observations for ethnically diverse constituencies. Point estimates and their 95% confidence intervals are presented. Cluster standard errors are used at the respondent level.